It's definitely looks like an interesting attack, though doesn't look to be in any way practical for use against your data stored in LastPass:
from article wrote:
Related-key attacks require a message to be encrypted with one key that is later changed to one or more different keys. It's usually hard for an outsider to control what keys get used, so the technique is considered hard to carry out under real-world settings.
Bruce Schneier wrote:
There are three reasons not to panic:
- The attack exploits the fact that the key schedule for 256-bit version is pretty lousy -- something we pointed out in our 2000 paper -- but doesn't extend to AES with a 128-bit key.
- It's a related-key attack, which requires the cryptanalyst to have access to plaintexts encrypted with multiple keys that are related in a specific way.
- The attack only breaks 11 rounds of AES-256. Full AES-256 has 14 rounds.
Your key only changes when you change your email/master password... and since SHA-256 is used to create the key your key won't be related. It is definitely surprising that this only impacts the 256-bit key version of AES (which is what LastPass uses), but also LastPass doesn't don't know the plain text, and LastPass is using all 14 rounds of AES which isn't impacted.
Joe